Ideas from 'Mental Files' by François Recanati [2012], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mental Files' by Recanati,François [OUP 2012,978-0-19-965999-9]].
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
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16357
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Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
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16360
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Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
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16374
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There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
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16354
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Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things
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18409
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Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
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16361
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A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object
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16371
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Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names
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16373
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Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one
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16375
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Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object
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16377
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Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content
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16378
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An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person
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16387
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Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction
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16358
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The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains
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16367
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There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files
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16368
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Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic
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16370
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A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
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16381
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The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers)
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
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16365
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Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
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16356
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There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
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16386
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Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well)
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16393
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In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
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16372
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Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense
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16388
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We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that
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16359
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Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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16355
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Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals
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16348
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Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties
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16384
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Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential)
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16352
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A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….'
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16353
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Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
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16382
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Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
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16389
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If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things
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16363
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Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction
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16364
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Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
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16351
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In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication
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16350
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Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
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16380
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Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication
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